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Dronenburg v. Zech: Strict Construction or
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility?
By Howard L. Pearlman*
Introduction
The question whether the United States Constitution protects the
private, consensual sexual conduct of homosexuals from government reg-
ulation has "swirled nationwide for many years."' The issue has arisen
primarily in criminal prosecutions under state sodomy statutes2 and in
discharge proceedings pursuant to military regulations proscribing ho-
mosexual activity.3 Defendants have argued that to the extent statutes or
regulations punish private, consensual sexual behavior, they violate
rights of privacy and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. States generally have argued that they have the right to proscribe
homosexuality, no matter how privately practiced, in order to promote
"morality and decency."' The military has argued further that the pres-
* B.A., 1980, Reed College; member, third year class.
1. See Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 105 S. Ct. 1373, 1375 (1985) (Brennan,
Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of cert., quoting 730 F.2d 444, 453 (6th Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., dissenting)).
2. E.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), summarily affg 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975); Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir.), cert granted, 106
S. Ct. 342 (1985); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 2891
(5th Cir. 1985); New York v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981). See New York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 64 (1983) (cert.
granted), cert denied as improvidently granted, 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984) (per curiam). See gener-
ally Comment, The Right of Privacy and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes,
15 U. TOL. L. REv. 811 (1984).
3. E.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984), reh'g en banc denied, 746
F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984);
Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Belier v. Lehman,
452 U.S. 905 (198 1); see Matthews v. Marsh, No. 82-0216 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 1984); benShalom v.
Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (homosexual "tendencies" without
overt homosexual activity). See generally Comment, Employment Discrimination in the Armed
Services-An Analysis of Recent Decisions Affecting Sexual Preference Discrimination in the
Military, 27 VILL. L. REv. 351 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202, 1205 (E.D. Va.
1975).
670 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 12:669
ence of homosexuals among its members disrupts "discipline, good order
and morale,"5 which impairs its ability to carry out its duties.
The Supreme Court has never resolved this issue6 or articulated a
principle of personal privacy to explain its right-to-privacy decisions. In
the absence of clear guidance, lower courts have divided sharply over the
appropriate standard of review for regulations of private homosexual be-
havior. Some courts have discerned in the Supreme Court's cases a prin-
ciple of personal privacy or autonomy broad enough to protect private,
consensual homosexual conduct from regulations that are not narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.7 Others have re-
fused to extend the right to privacy beyond its stated contours and, in the
absence of a constitutionally protected right, have upheld regulations of
homosexual activity under a minimum rationality test.8
In Dronenburg v. Zech,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit recently reinforced this latter view and re-
jected due process and equal protection challenges to a Navy policy re-
quiring mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct. Judge Robert
Bork, 10 writing for the court, concluded that the Supreme Court privacy
cases do not state a principle broad enough to include homosexual con-
5. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting SEC/NAV In-
struction 1900.9D (Mar. 12, 1981)). See Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 801-04 (9th Cir.
1980).
6. The Supreme Court has only indirectly addressed the issue by way of its summary
affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See discussion of Doe,
supra Part II.B and accompanying notes. This Term, the Supreme Court will address the issue
in Hardwick v. Bowers, cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 342 (1985). See infra note 122. The Supreme
Court earlier indicated 'a willingness to address the issue when it granted certiorari in New
York v. Uplinger, 104 S. Ct. 64 (1983); after briefing and oral argument, however, the Court
dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 104 S. Ct. 2332 (1984) (per curiam).
7. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1213 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 342 (1985); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1141 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289
(5th Cir. 1985); New York v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940-41, 434
N.Y.S.2d 947, 951 (1980). See also Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 81 (9th Cir. 1981) (Nor-
ris, J., dissenting); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203, 1205 (E.D. Va.
1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting).
8. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397-98 (D. C. Cir. 1984); Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202-03 (E.D. Va. 1975); cf. Rich v. Secretary of the
Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1227 n.7, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1984) (military's "compelling interest" in
regulating homosexual conduct); Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 807 (9th Cir. 1980) (ap-
plying a case-by-case balancing of the individual interest and the importance of the govern-
mental interest involved, the degree of infringement, and "the sensitivity of the government
entity" to tailor more carefully its regulation to meet its goals).
9. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
10. Judge Bork, while a professor at Yale Law School, advocated so-called "judicial self-
restraint" and strict construction of the Constitution. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1-20 (1971); Bork, The Impossibility of Find-
ing Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695 (1979). Judge Bork and Judge
Scalia, the two Circuit Judges on the Dronenburg panel, are considered to be high on President
Reagan's list of future Supreme Court appointees.
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duct and that a lower court should not "create" such a right.II Because
the regulation did not impinge on a "fundamental" constitutional right,
the court refused to apply "strict scrutiny" review under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.2 Applying minimum rationality review, the court upheld
the Navy regulation as rationally related to the legitimate end of legislat-
ing morality and, alternatively, to legitimate interests of the military.
13
In reaching this determination, the Dronenburg court gave an expansive
reading to the Supreme Court's ambiguous summary affirmance in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney," even as it declared that lower court judges
should narrowly interpret ambiguous constitutional doctrine. 15 Re-
vealing its faith in majoritarian morality and its distrust of the privacy
doctrine, the court failed to analyze fully the complex and important
constitutional issues involved in Dronenburg.
This Comment examines the Dronenburg court's privacy and equal
protection analyses. Part I presents the facts, holding, and reasoning of
Dronenburg, as well as the subsequent dissent from denial of rehearing en
banc. Part II considers two flaws in the court's analysis of Dronenburg's
privacy claim. First, the court did not fully apply the appropriate analy-
sis of summary affirmances in determining the precedential value of Doe
v. Commonwealth's Attorney. Second, the court unduly restricted the
Supreme Court's privacy cases to their facts and too narrowly interpreted
pivotal language in these cases. Part III examines arguments for height-
ened equal protection scrutiny of regulations affecting homosexuals,
which the Dronenburg court failed to address and analyze. Finally, the
Comment concludes that the Dronenburg court refused to conduct in-
dependent constitutional analysis to resolve the doctrinal ambiguity in
this troubled area of the law. As a result, Dronenburg is precedent for
denying the personal liberty of homosexuals without any justification be-
yond notions of "judicial restraint," "common sense," and traditional
prejudice.
I. Dronenburg v. Zech
A. The Facts
James Dronenburg, a twenty-seven-year-old petty officer, served in
the Navy for nine years with an unblemished service record, earning cita-
tions for outstanding job performance and obtaining a top security clear-
ance.' 6 While studying at the Defense Language Institute, he became
involved in a homosexual relationship with another student, a 19-year-
11. 741 F.2d at 1397.
12. See id. at 1397-98.
13. Id.
14. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), summarily affig 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
15. 741 F.2d at 1396 n.5.
16. Id. at 1389.
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old seaman recruit. The recruit broke off the relationship and made
sworn statements implicating Dronenburg in repeated homosexual
acts.'" The Navy gave Dronenburg formal notice that it was taking ad-
ministrative action under a Navy regulation mandating discharge of any
serviceman who engages in homosexual acts. 8 At a hearing before a
Navy Administrative Discharge Board, Dronenburg admitted to engag-
ing in homosexual acts in the barracks. The Board recommended a
"general" 'discharge but, on review, the Secretary of the Navy ordered
that Dronenburg be honorably discharged. ' 9
Dronenburg brought an action in federal court, alleging that the
Navy's policy requiring discharge of all practicing homosexuals violated
his constitutional rights to privacy and to equal protection of the laws.2°
He sought an injunction against the discharge and an order of reinstate-
ment. 21 The district court granted summary judgment for the Navy,
holding that private, consensual homosexual conduct is not constitution-
ally protected.22 After he was honorably discharged, Dronenburg ap-
pealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
17. Id.
18. The Navy regulation involved provided in relevant part: "[A]ny member who solicits,
attempts or engages in homosexual acts shall normally be separated from the naval service.
The presence of such a member in a military environment seriously impairs combat readiness,
efficiency, security and morale." Id. (citing SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978)).
The regulation did, however, permit retention only if the homosexual act was found to be a
single occurrence not likely to recur or to have an adverse effect on the soldier's military
performance or on the morale and discipline of his unit. Id. at 1389 n.1 (citing SEC/NAV
Instruction 1900.9C(6)(b) (Jan. 20, 1978)). SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9D (Mar. 12, 1981)
replaced and continued the policy of Instruction 1900.9C. Id.
19. 741 F.2d at 1389. There are five types of discharges from the military: honorable,
general, undesirable, bad conduct, and dishonorable. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The
Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 839 (1979).
Only the first three may be given as a result of the administrative process; the latter two may
only be given as a result of court-martial. Id. There are significant practical differences be-
tween an "honorable" and "general" discharge; first, because over ninety percent of military
personnel are honorably discharged, a lesser designation may stigmatize the soldier in civilian
life and his career. Second, certain veterans' benefits differ according to the type of discharge.
Id. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 310, 331 (1982); Note, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 465, 468-73 (1969).
20. 741 F.2d at 1388-89.
21. Dronenburg had amended his complaint to eliminate a damages claim. The court, as
a threshold matter, dismissed the government's argument that it lacked jurisdiction and as-
serted jurisdiction on two grounds: (1) the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the
constitutionality of military discharges, Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852,
859 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and (2) the United States and its officers are not insulated from suit for
injunctive relief by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 107
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1992).
22. 741 F.2d at 1389.
B. The Decision
Dronenburg argued on appeal that private, consensual homosexual
activity is within the constitutional right of privacy first recognized by
the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.2 3 He contended that Gris-
wold and subsequent privacy decisions established " 'that the government
should not interfere with an individual's freedom to control intimate per-
sonal decisions regarding his or her own body' except by the least restric-
tive means available and in the presence of a compelling state interest.
24
The court flatly rejected this argument and held that the Supreme
Court had not defined the right to privacy so broadly as to include homo-
sexual conduct and that the District of Columbia Circuit, as a lower
court, should not "create" such a right.25 In reaching this holding, the
court commented on the "peculiar jurisprudential problem" 26 posed by
the case. Judge Bork stated that "no court should create new constitu-
tional rights" which are not "fairly derived by standard modes of legal
interpretation from the text, structure, and history of the Constitu-
tion."2 7 According to Judge Bork, however, when the Supreme Court
"creates" new constitutional rights, lower courts are "bound absolutely"
by that determination 28 and should limit their analysis of these rights to
principles clearly stated by the Supreme Court.
29
The first step in the court's analysis was to consider whether
Supreme Court precedent applied. The court determined that the
Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attor-
ney 30 was binding precedent for the proposition that the constitutional
right to privacy does not include homosexual acts. In Doe, male homo-
sexuals sought to bar enforcement of a Virginia criminal sodomy stat-
23. 381 U.s. 479 (1965).
24. 741 F.2d at 1391 (quoting Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal at 15).
25. Id. at 1397.
26. Id. at 1395.
27. Id. at 1396 n.5. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
supra note 10, at 8.
28. 741 F.2d at 1396 n.5. While the court said it was doubtful whether the Supreme
Court should create such rights, it was certain that lower courts should not. Id. at 1396. The
court warned that if lower courts were to create new rights freely, many of these decisions
would evade Supreme Court review and "a great body of judge-made law" would result, pre-
empting "'another part of the governance of the country without express constitutional au-
thority.'" Id. at 1397 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977)
(White, J., dissenting)).
29. Id. at 1395. "The only questions open for [a lower court judge] are whether the
Supreme Court has created a right which, fairly defined, covers the case before us or whether
the Supreme Court has specified a mode of analysis, a methodology, which, honestly applied,
reaches the case we must now decide." Id. at 1396 n.5.
30. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), summarily aflg 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). Three jus-
tices dissented, noting probable jurisdiction. 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (Brennan, Marshall, Stevens,
JJ., dissenting).
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ute3I as it related to their private, consensual sexual activity. The district
court refused to extend the right to privacy to homosexual conduct be-
cause such conduct bears no relation to marriage, home, or family life,32
and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed. The Dronenburg court
stated that the Court's summary disposition was a vote on the merits,
which bound lower courts. 33 The court then reasoned that if a proscrip-
tion on homosexual conduct was sustainable in a civilian context, it was
clearly sustainable in a military context in light of the military's need for
discipline and order.34
Dronenburg argued, however, that the summary affirmance in Doe
was based not on the constitutional question but on plaintiffs' lack of
standing.35 Although the Dronenburg court agreed that the Doe plain-
tiffs may have lacked standing because they were not threatened with
prosecution, it refused to limit the precedential scope of Doe. To support
this conclusion, the court stated that the district court decision in Doe
was based on the constitutional issue and that the Supreme Court had
given no indication that its summary affirmance was based on an alterna-
tive ground.36
The court's analysis, however, did not end with Doe. Rather, re-
marking that Doe is "somewhat ambiguous precedent,, 37 the court pro-
ceeded to examine the Supreme Court's privacy cases. The court moved
from case to case, quoting select passages to demonstrate that each case
failed to state a privacy principle broad enough to include a right to ho-
mosexual conduct. 31 In the absence of any clear Supreme Court gui-
31. The statute challenged in Doe provided in relevant part: "'If any person shall...
carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily
submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a felony .... '" Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1200 (quoting VA. CODE § 18.1-212 (1950)).
32. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
33. 741 F.2d at 1392.
34. Id.
35. Id. This standing argument was made earlier by Professor Tribe. See L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943 (1978).
36. 741 F.2d at 1392.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1392-95. The court's terse conclusions are summarized as follows: Griswold v.
Connecticut "stressed the sanctity of marriage," but did not indicate what other activities were
protected by the "penumbral" right to privacy or how to reason about future claims. Loving v.
Virginia held that denial of the fundamental freedom to marry on the basis of racial classifica-
tion was a violation of equal protection and due process; nothing in this favors plaintiff. Eisen-
stadt v. Baird provided a test: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 405 U.S.
438, 453. This test failed to provide criteria by which to determine whether the governmental
regulation involved was "unwarranted" and whether it involved a matter "so fundamentally
affecting a person .... " Roe v. Wade located the right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty and restriction on state action and included in the right to
privacy only personal rights that are "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered
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dance, the court confined these decisions to their factual
underpinnings-marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships and childrearing-and concluded: "It need hardly be said that
none of these covers a right to homosexual conduct."39
The court then considered whether a more general principle of pri-
vacy underlies these decisions and applies to situations not addressed by
the Supreme Court. Again the court restricted its inquiry to language in
Supreme Court opinions. The only guidance it found was in Roe v.
Wade," in which the Court ruled that only those rights deemed "funda-
mental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" are included in
the right to privacy." The Dronenburg court found these formulations
to be mere "conclusions about particular rights enunciated"'42 that failed
to prescribe a workable analytic principle. Notwithstanding this criti-
cism, the court applied the test it discerned in Roe to concluded that the
right to homosexual conduct is not "fundamental" or "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."'43
The court then addressed Dronenburg's contention, based on gen-
eral constitutional principle, that the fact " 'that the particular choice of
partner may be repugnant to the majority argues for its vigilant protec-
tion-not its vulnerability to sanction.' "' The court interpreted this as
equivalent to the proposition that majority morality is always presump-
tively invalid under the Constitution. With this the court strongly dis-
agreed, stating that when the Constitution does not speak to the
contrary, the choices of officials elected by the majority are conclusively
valid.45 Legislative majorities can make moral choices contrary to the
desires of minorities, and this right, according to the court, is the basis of
valued legislation in areas such as civil rights, worker safety, and the
environment. Thus, the court reasoned that Dronenburg's argument,
which would undermine the basis of this valued legislation, was not a
legitimate basis for invalidation of the Navy regulation.46
Finding no interference with a fundamental right of privacy, the
court concluded that Dronenburg's right to equal protection was in-
liberty." 410 U.S. 113, 152. Although the Roe Court concluded that the right is "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy," it failed
to articulate a principle explaining what is and is not included in the right to privacy. Carey v.
Population Services International stated that the "underlying foundation" of the holdings in
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe was that the Constitution protected decisions related to matters
of childbearing. See infra Part II.C., for a critical analysis of these conclusions.
39. 741 F.2d at 1395-96.
40. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
41. Id. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
42. Id. at 1396.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1397 (quoting Appellant's Opening Brief on Appeal at 13).
45. Id.
46. Id.
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fringed only if the Navy regulation failed to pass a minimum rationality
test.47 Based on the premise that implementing morality is a legitimate
end, the court found the regulation rationally related to that end.a" Al-
ternatively, assuming that a Navy regulation must serve some further
end of the Navy, the court also concluded that the regulation was
"plainly" a rational means of achieving the legitimate end of maintaining
military morale and discipline.4 9 To ask the question is to answer it,
according to the court, given the "unique needs of the military"5 and
because the effects of homosexual conduct within a military unit "are
almost certain to be harmful to morale and discipline."'" Accordingly,
the court did not require the Navy to submit "social science data or the
results of controlled experiments to prove what common sense and com-
mon experience demonstrate.
'52
C. The Dissent from Denial of Rehearing En Banc
Dronenburg's petition for rehearing en bane was denied by a bitterly
divided court.53 Chief Judge Robinson, writing for the four dissenting
judges, considered the case of extreme practical and jurisprudential im-
portance and raised several objections to the Dronenburg panel's opinion.
First, he disagreed with the panel's conclusion that Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney was controlling precedent and accused the panel of
holding Dronenburg's constitutional claims "hostage to a one-word sum-
mary affirmance."54 While Chief Judge Robinson offered no view as to
whether the constitutional right to privacy protects homosexual conduct
or whether military regulations call for a relaxed standard of constitu-
tional review, he found the panel's resolution of these issues unsatisfac-
tory:5 "Instead of conscientiously attempting to discern the principles
underlying the Supreme Court's privacy decisions, the panel has in effect
thrown up their hands and decided to confine those decisions to their
facts."5 6 This method of "interpretation," Robinson suggested, is "an
abdication of judicial responsibility.
'57
More generally, the chief judge criticized the panel for substituting
"its own doctrinal preferences for the constitutional principles estab-
47. Id. at 1398 (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-49 (1976)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Robinson, C.J.,
Wald, Mikva, and Edwards, JJ., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1580.
55. Id. at 1581.




lished by the Supreme Court."58 In addition, he accused the panel of
failing to apply the minimum rationality test seriously and of failing to
describe adequately the rational basis for the challenged Navy policy.59
Pointing to the disparity between the Navy's mandatory discharge of
homosexuals and its case-by-case consideration of problems arising from
heterosexual behavior, the chief judge saw the need for "serious equal
protection analysis."6
II. The Right to Privacy
A. Development of the Constitutional Right to Privacy
Ever since the Supreme Court recognized a constitutionally guaran-
teed "right of privacy" in Griswold v. Connecticut,61 the doctrine has
been difficult to define and apply. Indeed, in Griswold itself, although
seven justices concluded that a Connecticut statute criminalizing the use
of contraceptives violated a fundamental right to marital privacy, they
disagreed over the textual source of this right. Justice Douglas saw in the
structure of the Constitution "penumbras, formed by emanations from
[specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights] that help give them life and
substance."62  According to Justice Douglas, the Third, Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth Amendments combine to create "zones of privacy."63 The
intimate relationship between husband and wife, which the Connecticut
statute sought to regulate, falls within one of these zones and is protected
from unjustified state intrusion. Justice Goldberg, concurring, argued
that the right to marital privacy, though not enumerated in the first eight
amendments of the Bill of Rights, nonetheless is a fundamental liberty
"retained by the people" and thus protected by the Ninth Amendment.'
The most influential opinion in Griswold was Justice Harlan's con-
currence, reaffirming his position in Poe v. Ullman that marital privacy
involves an aspect of the "liberty" expressly guaranteed by the Four-
58. Id. at 1581.
59. Id.
60. Id. Judge Bork, in a separate statement joined by Judge Scalia, "could not take seri-
ously" the dissent's call for serious equal protection analysis of the Navy's disparate treatment
of heterosexual and homosexual conduct. Judge Bork argued that "moral relativism" was
neither required by the Constitution nor was it "the moral stance of a large majority of naval
personnel." Id. at 1583. Moreover, Judge Bork observed that while the dissent faulted him for
failing to recognize a unitary privacy principle in the Supreme Court cases, they conspicuously
failed to articulate the principle involved. Id.
61. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
62. Id. at 484 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-22 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The Ninth Amendment provides: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
Summer 19851
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teenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 5 To the extent that "liberty" is
read as encompassing "privacy, "66 Justice Harlan's is the view most
firmly grounded in the text of the Constitution. According to Harlan,
certain rights which are "fundamental" 67 or "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, ,68 require "particularly careful scrutiny of the state
needs asserted to justify their abridgment."69
The problem, however, with this formulation is determining the
standard by which a particular right is deemed "fundamental" and thus
protected by the Due Process Clause. In response to the Griswold dis-
sent's criticism that this inquiry is inherently subjective and standard-
less,70 Justice Harlan, an advocate of "judicial self-restraint,"71 did not
see the task as hopelessly dependent on the personal opinions of judges
seeking to keep the Constitution "in tune with the times."72 According
to Justice Harlan, judicial restraint in this area requires "respect for the
teaching of history, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our
society," and appreciation of the doctrines of federalism and separation
of powers.73 Justice Goldberg also stated that determining which rights
are fundamental requires examination of the "'traditions and [collective]
conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted
[there]. . . as to be ranked fundamental.' "7 In dicta, however, without
any searching analysis, Justice Goldberg reaffirmed Justice Harlan's con-
clusion in Poe v. Ullman that criminal prosecution of homosexuality,
adultery, fornication, and incest, "however privately practiced,"75 unlike
the sexual intimacies of husband and wife, was not constitutionally
65. 381 U.S. at 500 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-45 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
66. As Justice Black observed in his dissent: "One of the most effective ways of diluting
or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word or words
of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less
restricted in meaning." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black noted,
for example, that "right to privacy" has replaced the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
"unreasonable searches and seizures." Id.
67. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961).
68. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
69. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543.
70. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 520-21 (Black, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 501. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 756 (1971) (Pen-
tagon Papers case) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (judicial deference to executive branch as to matters
of national security); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 333 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). "Judi-
cial restraint," as defined by Judge Bork, is "the philosophy that courts ought not to invade the
domain the Constitution marks out for democratic rather than judicial governance."
Dronenberg v. Zech, 746 F.2d at 1583.
72. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 493 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).




After Griswold, the Court expanded the right to privacy beyond the
marital relationship to protect unmarried individuals. In Eisenstadt v.
Baird,77 the Court invalidated a state statute which prohibited the use of
contraceptives by unmarried couples, declaring: "If the right to privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be
free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."'78  Thus, while the right of privacy in Griswold "inhered in the
marital relationship, '79 the Eisenstadt Court defined this relationship not
as an "independent entity" but as "an association of two individuals."8
One year later in the controversial case of Roe v. Wade,"' seven
members of the Court adopted Justice Harlan's view of privacy as an
aspect of Fourteenth Amendment liberty82 and held that the right to pri-
vacy "is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy."83 According to the Court, interference
with the exercise of this "fundamental" right required a narrowly drawn
legislative enactment expressing a "compelling state interest. ' 84 In sup-
port of this holding, the Roe Court failed to explain how it reached the
conclusion that a limited right to an abortion was "fundamental" and
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Notwithstanding the advice
of Justices Harlan and Goldberg in Griswold, the Roe Court did not base
its fundamental rights analysis on an express finding that the right to an
abortion is so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of our
people as to be ranked fundamental. Rather, it relied on then current
medical knowledge86 as well as psychological and sociological factors.87
76. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
77. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
78. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
79. Id.
80. Id. Moreover, the Court held that prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to un-
married persons violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 454-55.
81. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
82. Id. at 153; see id. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 153.
84. Id. at 155.
85. Justice Rehnquist argued that the fact that a majority of the states have restricted
abortions for at least a century indicates that the right to an abortion "is not 'so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked, fundamental .... ' " Id. at 174
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
86. See 410 U.S. at 149-50. The Roe decision, in the words of one constitutional scholar,
read[s] like a set of hospital rules and regulations, whose validity is good enough this
week but will be destroyed with new statistics upon the medical risks of childbirth
and abortion or new advances in providing for the separate existence of a foetus.
Neither historian, layman, nor lawyer will be persuaded that all the details prescribed
in Roe v. Wade are part of either natural law or the Constitution.
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Only in Moore v. City of East Cleveland"8 did a plurality of the
Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, determine whether a right is
"fundamental" for due process purposes by adopting Justice Harlan's
"judicial restraint" approach in Poe v. Ullman and Griswold.89 City of
East Cleveland involved a zoning ordinance that allowed only members
of a single "family" to live together and that defined "family" to exclude
extended families. 9° Under the ordinance, a sixty-three year old grand-
mother was criminally prosecuted for permitting two grandsons, who
were first cousins, to live with her.9 1 The plurality invalidated the ordi-
nance on substantive due process privacy grounds, finding that the ex-
tended family was an institution "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition" and thus "fundamental." 9 2 Justice Stewart, dissenting, re-
lied on a narrow view of constitutionally protected familial relations to
conclude that a grandmother's right to share "a single kitchen and a suite
of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives," 93 unlike decisions about
marriage and childbearing, did not rise to the level of being "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." To so equate the two rights, according
to Justice Stewart, extended substantive due process beyond
recognition.
94
City of East Cleveland demonstrates that determining the funda-
mentality of a right by examining whether it arises from a deeply rooted
tradition may involve "judgment and restraint" more than a readily dis-
cernible principle. One scholar, Professor Tribe, has suggested that in
determining what rights involve fundamental liberties, liberty must be
defined "at a high enough level of generality to permit unconventional
variants to claim protection along with mainstream versions of protected
A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113-14 (1976).
Similarly, Justice O'Connor has sharply criticized Roe's trimester framework and concept of
"viability" to the extent that each depends on changing medical knowledge. See City of Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting, joined by White, Rehnquist, JJ.) ("The Roe framework ... is clearly on a collision
course with itself.").
87. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
88. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
89. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
90. See 431 U.S. at 496 n.2. The definition of "family" was "essentially confined to par-
ents and their own children." Id. at 507 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 506. Mrs. Moore was living with her son and grandson when another grandson,
John, then less than a year old, came to live with her after his mother's death. Id. at 496-97,
506. Mrs. Moore was notified that under the zoning ordinance, John was an "illegal occu-
pant." When she refused to expel her grandson from her home, Mrs. Moore was criminally
prosecuted. Id. at 497.
92. Id. at 503-04. Cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (upholding zoning
ordinance defining "family" as including persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, or no
more than two unrelated persons in a household).
93. Id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
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conduct." 95 Assuming that in City of East Cleveland nuclear families
were "mainstream," the plurality's recognition of constitutional protec-
tion for "unconventional" extended families arguably involved precisely
this judgment of using a broad definition of protected family relations.
While the "outer limits" of personal privacy have not been marked
by the Supreme Court, 9 6 the Court has expressly recognized fundamental
rights in certain decisions relating to marriage,97 procreation,9" contra-
ception,9 9 abortion,"° family relations,10 1 and child rearing and educa-
tion.10 2 It remains unsettled, however, whether and to what extent the
right to privacy protects private sexual activity outside of these areas. 103
As one court observed, it is unclear whether a husband and wife can be
criminally prosecuted for privately and consensually engaging in oral or
anal sex."° Accordingly, the constitutional status of such sexual activity
among unmarried heterosexuals or among homosexuals is also uncertain.
Dicta in Griswold and Poe 105 suggest that the right to privacy does
not protect consensual homosexual conduct, even when privately prac-
ticed, from state regulation. This dicta alone formed the basis of a dis-
trict court's determination in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney that a
Virginia sodomy statute need only display minimum rationality to sur-
vive a privacy and equal protection challenge by homosexuals. 10 6 The
Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe, although considered by
several courts and commentators to be of little precedential value, 10 7 is
considered by some to establish that homosexual conduct is not constitu-
95. L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 946.
96. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. at 678, 684 (1977).
97. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
98. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
99. Carey, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
100. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
101. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944).
102. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
103. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5, 694 n.17.
104. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1135 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th
Cir. 1985).
105. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
106. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
107. E.g., Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1207-08 (1 lth Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
342 (1985); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228 n.8 (10th Cir. 1984); Baker v.
Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1136-39 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985). See
L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 943; P. BATOR, ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, Supp. 1981, at 159 n.l (Doe is "an egregious example of
an unexplained summary affirmance"); see also Richards, SexualAutonomy and the Constitu-
tional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30
HASTINGS L. J. 957, 1017 (1979).
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tionally protected."' 8
B. The Precedential Value of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
The Dronenburg court's cursory analysis of the precedential value of
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney failed to apply principles of analysis set
forth by the Supreme Court. The court stated that a summary affirm-
ance is a vote on the merits and thus binding on lower courts. Accord-
ingly, it considered itself bound by the district court's holding in Doe that
the right to privacy does not extend to private, consensual homosexual
conduct.109 Closer examination of Doe reveals that the Supreme Court's
summary affirmance need not be viewed as affirming the lower court's
determination of the plaintiffs' constitutional privacy claim.
The Supreme Court stated in Hicks v. Miranda 10 that its summary
affirmances have binding precedential effect."' Determining precisely
how much of the lower court opinion actually is affirmed, however, is
difficult. According to Chief Justice Burger, a summary affirmance af-
firms only the judgment of the court below, not its reasoning. 1 2 It does
not prevent a lower court from reaching an opposite conclusion except
on "the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those
actions."
1 13
The initial step in a lower court's analysis of a summary affirmance,
therefore, should be to ascertain what issues were properly presented in
the earlier action.114 This requires examination of the jurisdictional
statement in the earlier case to determine whether the constitutional is-
sues in both cases are the same.' 15 Next, the court must consider
whether the constitutional issues were necessarily decided by determin-
ing whether the judgment arguably rested on an alternative nonconstitu-
tional ground." 6 As Justice Brennan has stated: "The judgment should
not be interpreted as deciding the constitutional questions unless no
other construction of the disposition is plausible."' 17 Consequently, when
108. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 334 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Sneed, J., concurring and dissenting); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 352 (4th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
109. See 741 F.2d at 1391-92.
110. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
111. Id. at 344-45.
112. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182-83 (1978)
(citing Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
113. Id. at 182 (citing Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)). See generally Note,
The Precedential Effect of Summary Affirmances and Dismissals for Want of a Substantial
Federal Question by the Supreme Court After Hicks v. Miranda and Mandel v. Bradley, 64 VA.
L. REV. 117 (1978).
114. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. at 345 n.14.




the jurisdictional statement presents a constitutional issue but there is
arguably a nonconstitutional ground for the decision, the precedential
scope of the summary affirmance is necessarily unclear.
This precise problem arises in interpreting the precedential scope of
Doe and was, subsequent to Dronenburg, skillfully addressed by the Elev-
enth Circuit in Hardwick v. Bowers. 118 In Hardwick the court first noted
that the jurisdictional statement in Doe presented a constitutional chal-
lenge to Virginia's sodomy statute based on the right to privacy, due pro-
cess, and equal protection. This constitutional challenge is substantially
similar to that involved in Hardwick in which both homosexuals and
unmarried heterosexuals challenged Georgia's sodomy statute.119 The
court next observed that because the plaintiffs in Doe lacked standing to
sue, the Court's affirmance arguably rested on that alternative, noncon-
stitutional ground. 2 °
In resolving this conflict between the scope of the jurisdictional
statement and the plausible alternative ground for the disposition, the
Hardwick court concluded that the jurisdictional statement sets the
"outside limit on the precedential scope of a summary decision" and is a
"tool in determining the ultimate question: the most narrow plausible
rationale for the summary decision."121 The Doe plaintiffs' lack of stand-
ing is a narrower plausible basis for the Court's affirmance than the pri-
vacy issue raised in the jurisdictional statement. Accordingly, the
Hardwick court concluded that Doe was not controlling precedent be-
cause the homosexual plaintiff in Hardwick had standing. 122
118. 760 F.2d 1202, 1207-10 (10th Cir.), cert.granted, 106 S. Ct. 342 (1985).
119. Plaintiffs in Hardwick were a male homosexual and a married couple, all seeking a
declaration that Georgia's sodomy statute was unconstitutional as applied to them. Plaintiff
Hardwick had previously been arrested for engaging in consensual sodomy with another adult
male in the privacy of his own bedroom. Based on this arrest, Hardwick's intent to continue
engaging in consensual sodomy and the state's intent to continue enforcing its sodomy statute,
the court concluded that Hardwick had standing. 760 F.2d at 1206. The married couple,
however, failed to show a realistic threat of prosecution under the statute to establish standing.
Id. at 1206-07.
120. Id. at 1207 and n.5. The court observed that Doe may have presented nonconstitu-
tional standing problems. Cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974); Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
121. 760 F.2d at 1208.
122. Id. at 1206-07. See supra note 119. The Supreme Court has certified for review the
question: "(1) Did [the Hardwick] court err in concluding that Doe v. Commonwealth's At-
torney,. . . does not constitute precedent binding upon lower federal courts?" 54 U.S.L.W.
3292, 3293 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1985) (No. 85-140). Therefore, the Court will have to resolve the
questions of interpretation of summary affirmances addressed by Hardwick and other courts.
The Court also certified the substantive constitutional issue: "(2) Did the court err in conclud-
ing that Georgia's sodomy statute infringes upon fundamental rights of homosexuals and in
requiring the state to demonstrate a compelling interest in order to support constitutionality of
statute?" Id.
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While the Dronenburg court conceded that the Doe plaintiffs may
have lacked standing, it refused to adopt the narrow view of Doe's prece-
dential scope because the district court had decided the case on the con-
stitutional question and the Supreme Court did not indicate its
affirmance was based on lack of standing.1"3 This reasoning is unsound
for several reasons. First, the Court rarely states its reasoning and au-
thority in summary affirmances, even where, as in Doe, important consti-
tutional questions are presented."2 4 Therefore, the Court's failure to
note the lack of standing in Doe is of little, if any, significance. Second,
the issue is not whether the affirmed decision was decided "squarely on
the constitutionality of the statute," '125 but whether both the affirmed
case and the case at issue present identical constitutional issues in their
jurisdictional statements. In this regard, Chief Judge Robinson, in his
dissent from the denial of rehearing in Dronenburg, suggested that there
is an important difference between Doe's "pre-enforcement constitutional
challenge to a state criminal statute" and Dronenburg's "discharge pur-
suant to a military regulation not expressly authorized by statute." '26
More to the point, while Doe and Dronenburg present essentially the
same right to privacy issue, Doe did not present Dronenburg's equal pro-
tection question. The Virginia statute proscribed anal and oral sex prac-
ticed by heterosexuals as well as homosexuals, 127 while the Navy
regulation prohibited sexual acts between homosexuals only.1 28 As a re-
sult, the Dronenburg court's reasoning-"[i]f a statute proscribing homo-
sexual conduct in a civilian context is sustainable, then such a regulation
is certainly sustainable in a military context" 12 9-would be persuasive
only if the Doe statute expressly proscribed homosexual conduct, which
it did not. Finally, restricting a summary affirmance to what necessarily
was decided is not "speculation that the Court might possibly have had
123. 741 F.2d at 1392. Interestingly, District Judge Merhige, who dissented on the consti-
tutional issue raised in Doe, recently concluded that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance
in Doe was "an adjudication on the merits of the issues in that case." Doe v. Duling, 603 F.
Supp. 960, 965 (E.D. Va. 1985). In Duling, an unmarried heterosexual couple challenged the
constitutionality of Virginia's fornication and cohabitation statutes as applied to their private
sexual activity. Defendant, the Richmond Chief of Police, contended that Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney controlled the case. In rejecting this argument, Judge Merhige refused "to
speculate and extend the Supreme Court's affirmance in Doe beyond the facts presented
therein." Id. Based on those facts, he concluded that Doe established the constitutionality of
Virginia's sodomy statute as applied to private, consensual homosexual conduct, which does
not imply that the right to privacy would not protect the sodomistic conduct of heterosexuals.
Id.
124. See Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Risso, 428 U.S. 913, 919 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
125. 741 F.2d at 1392.
126. 746 F.2d at 1580.
127. See supra note 31.
128. See supra note 18.
129. 741 F.2d at 1392.
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something else in mind"; 3' rather, it gives narrow effect to the Court's
one word decisions, which seems altogether appropriate.
In sum, the Dronenburg court's conclusion that it was bound by the
Doe court's holding on the merits is contrary to the conclusion reached
by applying established principles. As the Hardwick court concluded,
Doe is properly construed as "an affirmance based on the plaintiffs' lack
of standing" '' and as otherwise noncontrolling precedent.
Even assuming Doe affirmed the district court's holding on the con-
stitutional issue, it would not bind a lower court if subsequent doctrinal
developments cast doubt on the constitutional interpretation implied by
the summary affirmance.13 2 The Dronenburg court failed to consider
doctrinal developments since Doe in determining Doe's precedential
scope. For example, since Doe, a plurality of the Court agreed in Carey
v. Population Services International that it "has not definitively answered
the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution pro-
hibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior
among adults."13 3 This suggests that at least a plurality of the Court did
not consider Doe dispositive of the constitutional status of consensual
homosexual conduct: if the Doe Court had affirmed the district court's
holding, one aspect of the question would have been definitively an-
swered. Significantly, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the plurality and,
citing Doe, insisted that the constitutional protection of "certain consen-
sual acts" had been definitively established.1 34 The language in Carey
nevertheless suggests, as several courts have found,13 1 that lower courts
are free to analyze the constitutional privacy claims of homosexuals in
spite of Doe.
Another doctrinal development, documented by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Hardwick, 136 was the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in New
York v. Uplinger.37 In Uplinger, 131 the New York Court of Appeals held
that a statute punishing loitering in public with the intent to engage in
"deviate sexual behavior" was unconstitutional because it punished
"conduct anticipatory to the act of consensual sodomy"'1 39 which was
130. Id.
131. 760 F.2d at 1208.
132. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 322, 344 (1974); Lecates v. Justice of the Peace, 637 F.2d
898, 904 (3d Cir. 1980).
133. 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5, 694 n.17 (1977).
134. Id. at 718 n.2.
135. See, eg., Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1209-10; Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp.
1121, 1138 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985). See also Dronenburg v.
Zech, 746 F.2d at 1580 (Robinson, C.J., dissenting).
136. 760 F.2d at 1210.
137. 104 S. Ct. 64 (1983).
138. People v. Uplinger, 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983).
139. 58 N.Y.2d at 937-38, 447 N.E.2d at 62-63, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
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decriminalized in People v. Onofre.14 Noting that the case was an "inap-
propriate vehicle" for addressing the constitutional issues involved, the
Court dismissed its writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 41 Nev-
ertheless, the original grant of certiorari indicated the Court's willingness
to address the issues in Uplinger, which included the constitutionality of
state sodomy laws. 142 As the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Hardwick
Uplinger, combined with Carey, indicates that the constitutional status of
private, consensual homosexual conduct is still open for lower court, and
ultimately Supreme Court, consideration.143
C. Critique of the Dronenburg Court's Privacy Analysis
The Dronenburg court's analysis of the privacy doctrine ignored im-
portant Supreme Court language and construed too narrowly the lan-
guage it chose to examine. The court was guided by its preferences for
strict construction of the Constitution and strict lower court adherence
to Supreme Court language where nontextual constitutional rights are
involved. 1" Based on these premises, the Dronenburg court restricted its
analysis to a case-by-case review of Supreme Court precedent, quoting
select passages in search of a clear principle or mode of analysis fairly
applicable to new claims. Evaluation of this analysis requires an exami-
nation of whether the selected language fairly represents the holding of
the case for which it purports to speak, and whether the language is fairly
susceptible of broader construction.
The Dronenburg court did not mention the significant post-Doe dec-
laration by the Supreme Court in Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional that the constitutional status of private consensual sexual behavior
was still unsettled. 145 Rather, the court cited only a brief passage from
Carey which stated that the personal right of decision in matters of
childbearing was the underlying foundation of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and
Roe. 146 Citing this passage out of context gave the false impression that
Carey limits the privacy doctrine to the area of childbearing. To the con-
trary, Justice Brennan, writing for the Carey Court, was particularly
careful to note that the concept of personal privacy is broader in scope
140. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981). See infra notes 159-166 and accompanying text.
141. 104 S. Ct. 2332, 2334 (1984) (per curiam) (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehn-
quist and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting, would have addressed the case on the merits).
142. 760 F.2d at 1210. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the Hard-
wick case to address the constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy law. Hardwick v. Bowers, 106
S. Ct. 342 (1985). See supra notes 119 and 122.
143. 760 F.2d at 1210.
144. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
145. 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5, 694 n.17 (1977).
146. 741 F.2d at 1395.
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than the underlying factual foundations of the Court's prior decisions.147
According to the Court, "[t]he decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child" is "in a field that by definition concerns the most intimate of
human activities and relationships. . among the most private and sen-
sitive [of decisions]."' 48
The Dronenburg court also overlooked the Court's suggestion in Ei-
senstadt v. Baird 149 that the privacy doctrine is potentially broader in
scope: "If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi-
vidual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."' 5 ° Had the Court omitted the phrase "matters so
fundamentally affecting a person," it would have restricted its holding to
the area of childbearing. The language the Court chose, however,
clearly invites extension of the right to privacy to other fundamental
matters. Yet, because the Court did not articulate specific criteria for
determining when governmental intrusion is "unwarranted" and what
other matters are fundamental, the Dronenburg court found no guidance
in this test.'
5 1
Other courts faced with the issue of whether the right to privacy
protects private, consensual homosexual conduct have found sufficient
guidance in the language of Eisenstadt and Carey. Judge Merhige, dis-
senting in Doe, found in Eisenstadt a principle of personal privacy that
includes a field of intimate concerns: "[E]very individual has a right to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into one's decisions on
private matters of intimate concern."'52 Judge Merhige then reasoned
that "[a] mature individual's choice of an adult sexual partner, in the
privacy of his or her own home," is a decision of utmost private and
intimate concern and thus is included in the right to privacy. '
Similarly, in Baker v. Wade, '54 a federal district court, citing the
Doe dissent with approval, held that a Texas sodomy law as applied to a
147. Justice Brennan broadly defined the right to privacy as including "the interest in inde-
pendence in making certain kinds of important decisions." 431 U.S. at 684 (quoting Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)). He also stated that "it is clear that among the decisions
that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are [those involving
the underlying factual foundations of the prior Court decisions]." Id. at 684-85 (emphasis
added).
148. 431 U.S. at 685 (emphasis added).
149. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
150. Id. at 453 (emphasis partly in original and partly added).
151. 741 F.2d at 1393-94.
152. 403 F. Supp. at 1203 (Merhige, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
153. Id. Judge Merhige outlined his view of the constitutional contours of protected sexual
behavior: the participants both must be capable of consent and in fact must have consented to
the sexual act; the right will not attach where a minor or force or coercion is involved; and the
act cannot take place in "publicly frequented areas." Id. at 1204-05.
154. 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985).
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male homosexual violated his fundamental right to privacy. The court
reasoned, from language in Eisenstadt and Carey, that "[t]he right of two
individuals to choose what type of sexual conduct they will enjoy in pri-
vate is just as personal, just as important, just as sensitive-indeed, even
more so-than the decision by the same couple to engage in sex using a
contraceptive to prevent unwanted pregnancy."1 55 The court concluded,
using the Eisenstadt test, that the right of privacy extends to the "deci-
sion to engage in private sexual conduct with another consenting
adult." 156 Also interpreting Eisenstadt, another federal district court in
benShalom v. Secretary of Army' 57 held that the right to privacy pro-
tected a lesbian soldier from military discharge for evidencing homosex-
ual tendencies without engaging in homosexual acts. The court
concluded that "one's personality, self-image, and indeed, one's very
identity" are matters so fundamentally affecting a person as to require
constitutional protection. 58
Perhaps the most searching analysis of the privacy doctrine and of
Eisenstadt in this context was made by the New York Court of Appeals
in New York v. Onofre." 9 Onofre consolidated three cases involving ar-
rests for engaging in consensual sodomy. In one case, Onofre was ar-
rested for engaging in "deviate sexual intercourse" with another male in
the privacy of Onofre's home; in the other cases, two men were arrested
for engaging in "oral sodomy" in a parked car on a city street, and a
woman was arrested for similar behavior. 6 The applicable New York
statute prohibited only unmarried persons from engaging in consensual
sodomy. The court held that the statute violated the defendants' rights
to privacy 16' and equal protection 162 under the federal Constitution.
In reaching its decision, the Onofre court acknowledged the impor-
tance of reading Eisenstadt together with Stanley v. Georgia, on which
the Supreme Court had relied in delineating its test in Eisenstadt.161 In
Stanley, the Court held that a statute criminalizing the possession of ob-
155. 553 F. Supp. at 1140 (emphasis added).
156. Id. The Fifth Circuit's recent reversal of the district court's decision in Baker v. Wade
did not present a reasoned analysis of the privacy claim. Rather, in one paragraph the court
asserted that Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney was binding precedent, citing Dronenburg v.
Zech for support. 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985).
157. 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
158. Id. at 975.
159. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981).
160. 51 N.Y.2d at 483-84, 415 N.E.2d at 937-38, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
161. See id. at 488-90, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951-52.
162. Id. at 491-94, 415 N.E.2d at 942-44, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953-54.
163. Id. at 487, 415 N.E.2d at 939-40, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 950. See Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting) (Stanley "teaches us that socially
condemned activity, excepting that of demonstrable external effect, is and was intended by the
Constitution to be beyond the scope of state regulation when conducted within the privacy of
the home").
scene matter within the home violated the First Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy.16" In a footnote appended to
its citation to Stanley, the Eisenstadt Court quoted Justice Brandeis' fa-
mous dissent in Olmstead v. United States: " '[The makers of our Consti-
tution] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized man.' "16 Reading Eisenstadt together
with Stanley, the Onofre court concluded that the Supreme Court in-
tended the right to privacy to include even "deviant" conduct likely to
arouse moral indignation among broad segments of the community, as
long as the conduct was practiced voluntarily in a noncommercial, pri-
vate setting.
166
The Dronenburg court's analysis overlooked the significance of Stan-
ley. Instead, the court merely asserted that the state can legitimately reg-
ulate private deviant conduct on moral grounds. 167 In support, the court
cited Justice Harlan's dissenting remark in Poe v. Ullman that the state
may proscribe by criminal statutes private intimate sexual matters be-
tween unmarried persons or homosexuals. 68 Eisenstadt, however, to




In addition, the Dronenburg court declared that "[w]hen the Consti-
tution does not speak to the contrary," legislation of morality is conclu-
sively valid.'70 Although this proposition may well be true, it fails to
resolve the problem involved in Dronenburg-namely, whether the Con-
stitution has in fact spoken. To the extent that the Stanley citation quali-
fies the Eisenstadt test,' 7 ' the Supreme Court has suggested that when
certain behavior-however morally repugnant to the majority-is prac-
ticed in private without external harm, the Constitution has spoken af-
firmatively to protect the behavior from majoritarian regulation. Thus,
164. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
165. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453 n.10 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
166. 51 N.Y.2d at 488, 415 N.E.2d at 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 951. Cf. Lovisi v. Slayton,
539 F.2d 349, 351-52 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied sub nom. Lovisi v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S.
977 (1976) (presence of third-party onlooker in bedroom while married couple engaged in
consensual sodomy dissolved expectation of privacy); United States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832
(8th Cir. 1983) (right of privacy does not protect oral sodomy between two men in public
restroom); Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1975) (oral sodomy in parked car on
public highway).
167. See 741 F.2d at 1397-98.
168. 367 U.S. at 553.
169. See Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1204 (Merhige, J., dissenting). This perhaps explains why the
Dronenburg court chose not to quote language from Justice Harlan's dissent.
170. 741 F.2d at 1397. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
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the Dronenburg court should have addressed the suggestions in Eisen-
stadt and Carey that the privacy doctrine is of a broader scope than the
factual bases of the Court's decisions; and it should have resolved any
ambiguity with doctrinal analysis rather than merely reciting dicta.
The Dronenburg court found little in the language of Roe v. Wade'72
to guide its analysis. Roe adopted Justice Harlan's view in Griswold that
rights deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty" are included in the privacy/liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. 173 The Dronenburg court rejected
these formulations because they were mere "conclusions about particular
rights enunciated," which failed to prescribe a mode of reasoning.' 74
Notwithstanding this criticism, Judge Bork was willing to "conclude"
that the right to homosexual activity was not "fundamental" or "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty."'
1 75
Judge Bork's conclusory remarks disregard the principles for deter-
mining fundamentality set forth by Justices Harlan and Goldberg in Poe
and Griswold and applied in City of East Cleveland.176 Although the Roe
Court may be criticized for failing to analyze thoroughly our nation's
deeply rooted traditions in concluding that a limited right to an abortion
is "fundamental,"' 177 the determination of which rights are fundamental
need not be arbitrary, as Griswold and City of East Cleveland demon-
strate. Thus, complete rejection of these formulations was inappropriate.
At most, the Dronenburg court's fundamental rights analysis noted
only that homosexuality has been "a form of behavior never before pro-
tected, and indeed traditionally condemned."' 17 True as this may be, it
does not compel the conclusion that the decision to engage in private,
consensual homosexual conduct is not a fundamental right. Indeed, it
hardly can be said that termination of unwanted pregnancies is a deeply
rooted national tradition "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Roe determined that
the fundamental right of privacy precludes unwarranted governmental
intrusion into a woman's decision whether to abort during the first tri-
mester of pregnancy. Given this, the Dronenburg court should have ex-
plained what principle protects a woman's right to choose a first
trimester abortion, but allows a state to criminally prosecute her for her
expressions of sexual intimacy with another woman in the privacy of her
172. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
173. See supra notes 65-73, 81-87 and accompanying text.
174. 741 F.2d at 1396.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
177. See A. Cox, supra note 86.
178. 741 F.2d at 1396.
home. 179 Clearly, only by formulating a principle of fundamental liberty
which is broader than the Dronenburg court's, do Roe, and indeed Eisen-
stadt and Carey, make sense. Courts that have recognized this principle
in its broader context have required a compelling governmental interest
to justify regulation of the private, consensual sexual acts of
homosexuals. 1 'o
III. Equal Protection
Dronenburg's equal protection challenge to the Navy regulation ar-
guably confronted more directly the type of discrimination against
homosexuals effected by the regulation than did the right to privacy chal-
lenge. This is because the more immediate question posed by
Dronenburg's situation is not whether he had a right to engage in pri-
vate, consensual homosexual activity, but rather why this behavior calls
for mandatory discharge while prohibited heterosexual behavior receives
a case-by-case review. Indeed, the same arguments against extending the
right to privacy to include homosexual behavior militate in favor of equal
protection analysis. That is, if the right to engage in private consensual
homosexual conduct does not form part of a traditional liberty-and in
fact has been "traditionally condemned"-then the need for a more care-
ful scrutiny of statutes regulating homosexual behavior is apparent.
The Dronenburg court, however, relied on traditional social con-
demnation of homosexuality to deny both the privacy and equal protec-
tion claims. The court's cursory equal protection analysis essentially
consisted of one sentence: "[I]f no [right to privacy] exists, then appel-
lant's right to equal protection is not infringed unless the Navy's policy is
not rationally related to a permissible end."1 ' Thus, the court assumed
that any heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause was de-
179. See Richards, Homosexuality and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 8 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 311, 314 (1979) ("The difference between homosexuality ... and abortion
is not constitutional or moral principle, but popularity; namely, that the non-procreational
model in the other areas is supported by substantial popular sentiment, whereas homosexuality
is still the settled object of widespread social hostility and opprobrium.").
180. See, eg., Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1lth Cir.), cerL granted, 106 S. Ct. 342
(1985); Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985); benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980); New York v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
(1981). See also Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1981) (Norris, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en bane); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203
(E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting). Cf. Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220,
1227 n.7, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1984) (court found it "unnecessary" to analyze constitutional
principle: "even if privacy interests were implicated. . ., they are outweighed by the Govern-
ment's interest in preventing armed service members from engaging in homosexual conduct.");
Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied sub nom. Belier
v. Lehman, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
181. 741 F.2d at 1391 (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247-49 (1976)).
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pendent upon and coextensive with the existence of a fundamental right.
This reasoning failed to consider the "suspect class" prong of the
Supreme Court's equal protection doctrine, under which Dronenburg ar-
gued for heightened scrutiny of regulations affecting homosexuals.
In Plyler v. Doe, 182 the Supreme Court stated that heightened scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause applies only where the chal-
lenged law impinges on "the exercise of a 'fundamental right'" or
disadvantages a "suspect class."' 83 A "fundamental right" for these pur-
poses is one that finds its source "explicitly or implicitly" in the Constitu-
tion.' The right to privacy is such an "implicit" fundamental
constitutional right.'85 Accordingly, when the Dronenburg court found
that no right to privacy was implicated, it simultaneously found that
strict scrutiny under the fundamental rights prong of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause did not apply.
The court then should have considered whether heightened scrutiny
was appropriate under the suspect class prong. This analysis recognizes
that certain groups have historically been "relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." '86 Traditionally, strict scrutiny has been
applied to "suspect" classifications based on race,"8 7 alienage,188 and na-
tionality. 89 More recently, the Court has applied a middle level "height-
ened scrutiny" to classifications based on gender, 190 illegitimacy,' 9 ' and
to discrimination against illegal alien children.' 92 Several "indicia of sus-
pectness" have been articulated by the Court and commentators to guide
a determination of when to apply heightened scrutiny: whether the class-
182. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
183. Id. at 216-17.
184. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
185. See Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 105 S. Ct. 1373, 1377 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
186. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
187. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S 184, 191-92 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (racial classifications "constitutionally suspect").
188. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
371-72 (1971). But see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (5-4 decision, applying mere
rationality review).
189. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (racial classifications
subject to the "most rigid scrutiny").
190. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Bo-
ren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender classifications "must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
191. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259
(1978).
192. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1981). But see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (old age not a suspect class); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.




ification affects a "discrete and insular" minority," 3 groups character-
ized as "perennial losers in the political struggle";' 94 whether the
classification is defined by an immutable characteristic "determined by
causes not within the [person's] control";"9 whether it is based on a ster-
eotype, 196 or generalization "whose incidence of counterexample is sig-
nificantly higher than the legislative authority appears to have thought it
was"; 197 and whether the group involved has suffered from a history of
past discrimination. 98
Applying these indicia of suspectness to homosexuals, Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, as well as several commentators, have concluded that
homosexuality should be recognized as a suspect classification requiring
strict or heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 199 Ac-
cording to Professor Tribe, for example, homosexuals may constitute a
discrete and insular minority solely because of the history of discrimina-
tion against them.2"° Justice Brennan recently reinforced this observation
when he concluded that homosexuals constitute a "significant and insu-
lar minority" in our country.2 ° ' Justice Brennan further argued that
homosexuals historically have been subject to "pernicious and sustained
hostility" reflecting "'deep-seated prejudice rather than . . . rational-
ity,'" with the result that homosexuals are politically powerless to pro-
193. See, eg., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (quoting United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938) (Stone, J.)).
194. L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 1002.
195. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976); see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 686 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, J.); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 220 (although illegal alien
status is not an "immutable characteristic," it is a "legal characteristic over which children can
have little control").
196. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 405-06 (1977) (separate
opinion of Blackmun, J.).
197. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 157 (1980).
198. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 682-84 (1973) (history of sex discrimination);
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1980) (no past discrimination against men);
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28-29.
199. See, eg., Rowland, 105 S. Ct. at 1377-78 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); L.
TRIBE, supra note 35, at 944-45 n.17; Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation:
Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1297-1309 (1985); Com-
ment, Dronenburg v. Zech: Judicial Restraint or Judicial Prejudice?, 3 YALE LAW & POL'Y
REV. 245, 253-56 (1984); Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Height-
ened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (1984);
Friedman, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to Discrimination in Employment Based on
Sexual Orientation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 527, 556-61 (1979); Note, The Constitutionality of Laws
Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1624-28 (1974). See also J.
ELY, supra note 197, at 162-64.
200. L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 944.
201. Rowland, 105 S. Ct. at 1377 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan noted that Judge
Edward's dissent in the court below cited evidence that homosexuals may constitute 8 to 15%
of the average population. Id. at 1377 n.7 (citing 730 F.2d at 455-56 (citing J. MARMOR,
HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL (1980))).
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tect their rights because they are reluctant to risk public opprobrium.202
This political powerlessness, it has been argued, is evidenced by the fail-
ure of legislative bodies to change laws discriminating against homosexu-
als. 20 3 For example, twenty-three states and the District of Columbia
continue to criminalize consensual homosexual acts. 21 Moreover, Pro-
fessor Tribe has cited psychological and physiological studies indicating
that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic which is not within a
person's control and, once formed, is not likely to change.20 5
Thus, a strong case can be made for applying strict or heightened
scrutiny to the Navy regulation in Dronenburg. Whatever conclusion the
court ultimately might have reached, its failure even to consider whether
homosexuals as a class bear "indicia of suspectness" was a serious flaw in
its equal protection analysis.
Ironically, the Dronenburg court's application of minimum rational-
ity review reveals the very stereotypes and prejudice against homosexuals
that call for stricter scrutiny. The court did not examine the rational
relationship between mandatory discharge of homosexuals and the
Navy's goal of maintaining morale and discipline; it merely restated the
Navy's asserted interests, which themselves amounted only to common
stereotypes about homosexuals.20 6 The court simply declared that "com-
202. Id. at 1377.
203. See Note, 57 S. CAL. L. REv., supra note 199, at 825-27.
204. See id. at 800.
205. L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 944-45 n.17.
206. 741 F.2d at 1398. The Navy's reasons for mandatory discharge were stated as follows:
It is considered that administrative processing is mandatory. This is because it is
perceived that homosexuality adversely impacts on the effective and efficient per-
formance of the mission of the United States Navy in several particulars.
(a) Tensions and hostilities would certainly exist between known homosexuals
and the great majority of naval personnel who despise/detest homosexuality, espe-
cially in the unique close living conditions aboard ships.
(b) An individual's performance of duties could be unduly influenced by emo-
tional relationships with other homosexuals.
(c) Traditional chain of command problems could be created, i. e., a proper
command relationship could be subverted by an emotional relationship; an officer or
senior enlisted person who exhibits homosexual tendencies will be unable to maintain
the necessary respect and trust from the great majority of naval personnel who de-
spise/detest homosexuality, and this would most certainly degrade the individual's
ability to successfully perform his duties of supervision and command.
(d) There would be an adverse impact on recruiting should parents become con-
cerned with their children associating with individuals who are incapable of main-
taining high moral standards.
(e) A homosexual might force his desires upon others or attempt to do so. This
would certainly be disruptive.
(f) Homosexuals may be less productive/effective than their heterosexual coun-
terparts because of:
(1) Fear of criminal prosecution;
(2) Fear of social stigmatization;
(3) Fear of loss of spouse and/or family through divorce proceedings as a result
of disclosure;
(4) Undue influence by a homosexual partner.
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mon sense and common experience" demonstrate that the effects of ho-
mosexuality are "almost certain to be harmful to morale and discipline,"
and that mandatory discharge is a rational means of avoiding this
harm.
207
The court stated that Dronenburg illustrated the dangers which ho-
mosexual acts present in the military: such episodes are certain "to call
into question the even-handedness of superiors' dealings with lower
ranks, to make personal dealings uncomfortable where the relationship is
sexually ambiguous, to generate dislike and disapproval among many
who find homosexuality morally offensive, and. . . to enhance the possi-
bility of homosexual seduction. 20 8 This remark implies that Dronenburg
may have used his age and rank to coerce his sexual partner, yet no evi-
dence to support this possibility was presented or discussed in the opin-
ion. Moreover, because the court considered "common sense" sufficient
to dispose of the issue, it did not require the Navy to offer any evidence
to support its asserted interests. Thus, although the maintenance of mo-
rale and discipline is certainly a legitimate interest of the military,
Dronenburg contains no evidence indicating that the presence of homo-
sexuals has ever actually harmed military morale and discipline.
Conclusion
While the Dronenburg court did not misapply a clearly defined con-
stitutional principle, it did substitute its preference for strict construc-
tion-so called "judicial restraint"-for analysis of the difficult and
important principles involved. As a consequence, Dronenburg may be
more important for what it did not do than for what it did. It did not
adequately examine the precedential scope of the Supreme Court's sum-
mary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney. It did not acknowl-
edge important principles set forth, however ambiguously, in controlling
Supreme Court decisions. And it did not consider the Navy's disparate
treatment of homosexuals under the suspect class prong of the equal pro-
tection analysis.
Instead, the Dronenburg court gave broad precedential scope to the
Court's one-word opinion in Doe. It confined prior Supreme Court
precedents to their factual underpinnings and limited important language
in those cases to their narrowest meanings. It incorporated into its opin-
ion traditional prejudice against homosexuals as a basis for denying strict
scrutiny under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811 n.22 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981).
All of these alleged military interests failed to survive the heightened scrutiny of one circuit
judge. See Miller v. Rumsfeld, 647 F.2d 80, 86-89 (9th Cir. 1981) (Norris, J., dissenting).
207. 741 F.2d at 1398.
208. Id.
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Constitution and as a basis for upholding the Navy regulation as mini-
mally rational.
From its inception as a constitutional principle, the right to privacy
has not been susceptible of clear definition. Nonetheless, underlying the
privacy doctrine is the idea that there are certain decisions and forms of
behavior which are so personal, intimate, and sensitive that a state may
regulate them only when necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
This general principle arguably includes the decision to engage in private,
consensual homosexual conduct.
If the Dronenburg court had recognized an applicable privacy prin-
ciple, the case would have survived summary judgment and turned on its
genuine issues of fact, including whether Dronenburg's behavior was
"private" and "consensual" and, if so, whether the Navy's interests in
prohibiting this behavior were compelling. The trial court might have
found that barracks on a Navy base are not "private"; evidence might
have demonstrated that Dronenburg used his age and rank to coerce his
sexual partner; and the Navy might have submitted sufficient evidence of
problems and conflicts due to homosexual conduct in its ranks to estab-
lish that mandatory discharge is necessary to maintain morale and disci-
pline. Rather than allow the trial court to address these issues, however,
the Dronenburg court decided the case on the grounds of stereotype and
''common sense" morality.
Dronenburg takes on a further significance in light of the current
AIDS epidemic, which threatens to aggravate traditional hostility to-
ward homosexuals.20 9 Under the Dronenburg view that homosexuals are
not to be afforded a right to privacy or suspect class status, the state need
only articulate a conceivable rational basis for its regulation of homosex-
ual conduct. If mandatory discharge of all practicing homosexuals from
the military was rationally related to the legitimate end of legislating mo-
rality, is not the removal of homosexuals from the general work force,
indeed from other public places, also rationally related to the even more
clearly legitimate state interest in promoting public health? Certainly
Dronenburg, by approving the discharge of an exemplary soldier without
consideration of a rational nexus between his sexual identity and work
performance, has demonstrated, at least in a military context, the ease of
isolating homosexuals from participation in society. 10 Without the pro-
209. See generally Comment, AIDS-A New Reason to Regulate Homosexuality?, 11 J.
CONTEMP. L. 315 (1984); N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1985, at 11, col. 1 (noting various legislative
proposals requiring certain workers to undergo AIDS antibody testing, requiring the reporting
of positive test results to state health officials, quarantining AIDS patients, and making it a
felony for homosexuals to donate blood).
210. But see benShalom v. Secretary of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 977 (E.D. Wis. 1980)
(no "nexus" between lesbian soldier's homosexuality and her suitability for service); Norton v.
Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (dismissal of homosexual civil service employee
invalid absent nexus between his homosexuality and work performance).
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tection of heightened scrutiny, the possibility exists that courts will use
minimum rationality review to rubber-stamp sweeping state regulation of
homosexuals on the grounds of public health. Thus, the need could not
be greater for heightened scrutiny to assure that necessary government
regulation of homosexual activity is narrowly tailored to further no more
than the state's interest in preventing the spread of disease.
The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade established that,
notwithstanding moral objections, our concept of ordered liberty would
not tolerate relegating one million women a year who seek to terminate
their pregnancies to unhealthy and illegal abortions. Similarly, our Con-
stitution will not permit arbitrary treatment of more than twenty million
of our population21" ' based solely on the expression of sexual identity.
The principle supporting this conclusion is not, as the Dronenburg court
suggested, a judicial creation: it is the concept of fundamental personal
liberty embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fohrteenth
Amendment.
211. See supra note 201.
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